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I. INTRODUCTION
This article explores the issue on how a coastal State may
resolve transborder hydrocarbon exploitation issues with a sponsor
State and the International Seabed Authority ("Authority") under the
United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea of 1982 ("UNCLOS").
In discussing this topic, I will determine: 1) the types of agreements that
could be made by a coastal State, 2) which parties have what powers,
such as veto rights, and 3) how a coastal State could deal with the
Authority when a transboundary hydrocarbon deposit is shared
between them. I will also address potential conflicts of law present
within UNCLOS, specifically between Articles 81 and 85, and Articles
78 and 142. This article does not deal with issues pertaining to
installations or environmental concerns, but rather examines a legal
topic that may be of future importance as hydrocarbons become more
scarce.
II. GEOLOGICAL FEASIBILITY OF DEEP SEABED HYDROCARBONS
This article would be abstract unless there is a potential for
existence of hydrocarbon deposits that span from the continental
margin of coastal States to the Area. For my questions to be properly
addressed, it needs to be determined whether there is any potential for
transboundary hydrocarbon deposits at the edge of coastal States'
continental margins and the Area, and if the exploration and
exploitation of such deposits is economically feasible. The world's
resources of fossil fuels are finite and have been consumed at rates that
could lead to their exhaustion within hundreds of years.' Since 2000,
deepwater hydrocarbon production capacity has more than tripled, and
is only expected to increase as the demand for hydrocarbons continues
to rise.2 Hydrocarbon deposits located within the subsoil of the
* Erik A. Neff graduated from the University of Miami School of Law in December
2012 with a joint J.D and LL.M in Ocean and Coastal Law. The author would like to
sincerely thank Professor Bernard H. Oxman for his invaluable guidance. The author
can be reached at enefflawggmail.com.
1 Sir Eric Drake, Oil Reserves and Production, 276 PHILOSOPHICAL TRANSACTIONS OF
THE ROYAL SOCIETY OF LONDON. SERIES A, MATHEMATICAL AND PHYSICAL SCIENCES,
453, 456 (1974).
2 Rebecca K Richards, Deepwater Mobile Oil Rigs in the Exclusive Economic Zone and
the Uncertainty of Coastal State Jurisdiction, 10 J. INT'L Bus. & L. 387, 410 (2011).
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continental margin were generated over the course of geological time,
and are "not renewable" in terms of industrial timespan and the current
rate of exploitation.3 Further, " [t]he minimum size of accumulation
needed to justify production of [hydrocarbons] depends on the
economics of the operations and reserves are therefore influenced by
economic circumstances."4
Assessing hydrocarbon potential is not a simple question, nor
can it be determined by a single parameter or factor.5 As H.R. Warman
stated, any assessment of deepwater hydrocarbon potential should
consider all relevant geological factors that support hydrocarbon
formation;
The range of depth of burial for oil generation appears to be
from 1 to 3.5 km with an optimum for giant fields in the
range 1.5-3 km. Gas is most abundant in the range 3.0-4.5
km. Gas exists below that to considerable depths, in fact at
least to 10 km, but below 4.0 km there is normally a marked
and continuous decrease m reservoir porosity and
permeability. Deformation to form traps must occur at the
correct time to collect the hydrocarbons produced during
the main period of migration. All these requirements must
be met for the formation of large and highly productive
fields.6
The range of depth of burial for oil generation appears to be from 1 to
3.5 km with an optimum for giant fields in the range 1.5-3 km. Gas is
3 Drake, supra note 1, at 456 ("[Hydrocarbons] are now being consumed at rates that
will lead to their exhaustion in a matter of hundreds of years, a negligible period on the
geological time scale, and not therefore renewable within the time span of our industrial
society").
4 Id. at 453.
5 Leigh Royden, J. G. Sclater, & R. P. Von Herzen, Continental Margin Subsidence and
Heat Flow: Important Parameters in Formation of Petroleum Hydrocarbons, 64 THE
AM. Ass'N. OF PETROLEUM GEOLOGISTS BULL., 173, 184 (1980) ("[T]he presence of oil
or gas ... depends not only upon the thermal history of the area, but also upon sediment
composition and structures").
6 H.R. Warman, Hydrocarbon Potential of Deep Water, 290 PHILOSOPHICAL
TRANSACTIONS OF THE RoYAL SOCIETY OF LONDON. SERIES A, MATHEMATICAL AND
PHYSICAL SCIENCES, 33, 35 (1978).
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most abundant in the range 3.0-4.5 km. Gas exists below that to
considerable depths, in fact at least to 10 km, but below 4.0 km there is
normally a marked and continuous decrease in reservoir porosity and
permeability. Deformation to form traps must occur at the correct time
to collect the hydrocarbons produced during the main period of
migration. All these requirements must be met for the formation of
large and highly productive fields.7
Geologically speaking, the floor of the ocean is not flat. It has
distinguishing formations such as: mid-ocean ridges, abyssal plains or
ocean basins, and continental margins. Mid-ocean ridges, which make
up 32.7 percent of oceanic areas, do not appear to have the appropriate
geological character for hydrocarbon formation and thus can be
"dismiss[ed] totally" for hydrocarbon potential.8 Abyssal plains are
located beneath 4,000 meters of water, and cover 41.8 percent of the
ocean floor. Their sedimentary veneer, however, is too thin and lacks
the permeable rock that is considered to be a major contributor to
hydrocarbon production.9 By these geographic approximations,
roughly 74 percent of the deepwater subsoil would not be ideal for
hydrocarbon exploration. Of what remains, continental margins are the
areas of the seabed that are most likely to have hydrocarbon deposits.
Based on geological variations and structures, it is thought that passive
continental margins10 are more probable to have hydrocarbons than
those of the active Pacific type."
From the above research, it appears that the probability of
hydrocarbon deposits at the edge of the continental margin, especially
in passive margins, is higher than anywhere else on the seabed.
However, even with the existence of all of the appropriate geological




10 Such as, the margins in the Atlantic Ocean, Indian Ocean, and the Arctic Ocean.
1 Warman, supra note 6, at 36. See infra pp. 53-54 (continental margins may be
"passive" or "active." Passive margins are devoid of tectonic activity with a wide, long,
and flat continental shelf with gentle a slope. Active margins are tectonically active with
a narrow continental shelf that steeply drops off into the oceanic crust, i.e. the
subduction zone.).
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reserves, let alone large deposits, is still rather small.12 The economics,
including political considerations, of deepwater drilling will strongly
factor into the decision making for exploring and exploiting such
hydrocarbon deposits.
III. THE CONTINENTAL SHELF: A LAW/GEOGRAPHY DICHOTOMY
The term continental shelf can be defined in both legal and
geological terms. With the geological lexis, the continental shelf is part
of the continental margin, which is comprised of, in order: the shelf,
slope, and rise. The rise leads to the abyssal plain, which is part of the
deep seabed. The abyssal plain and the other areas not comprised of the
continental margin are approximately where the Area exists.13 Despite
these specifically defined areas of the continental margin, considerable
geological variation exists and the demarcation of abyssal plains and
continental margins may be contentious. Further, the breadths of the
continental shelves are not uniform. The average breadth of a
continental shelf is 42 nautical miles (NM) and varies greatly
throughout the world.14 Under UNCLOS, the continental shelf is a legal
construct, and by definition it is comprised of " [...] the seabed and
subsoil of the submarine areas that extend beyond its territorial sea
throughout the natural prolongation of its land territory to the outer
edge of the continental margin."15 UNCLOS, Article 76 prescribes that a
coastal State's continental shelf be measured from the same baselines
that the breadth of its territorial sea is measured. Under UNCLOS, if the
geographical continental margin of a coastal State does not span 200
NM, then its legally defined continental shelf is 200 NM. 16 From the
above descriptions, it is obvious that the judicial continental shelf
overlaps with the geographical continental margin, and also expands
12 The existence of the factors for the formation of hydrocarbons is a necessary but not
sufficient indicator of hydrocarbons.
13 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 1(1), 76, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S.
397, 428; See also Message from the President of the United States, UNCLOS, with
Annexes, and the Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the U.N.
Convention on the Law of the Sea, with Annexes, Treaty Doc. 103-39 (2nd Sess. 1994)
[hereinafter UNCLOS].
14 JOHN L. MERO, THE MINERAL RESOURCES OF THE SEA 53 (1964).
15 UNCLOS, supra note 13, art. 76(1).
16 Id. art. 76(1).
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the definition of the continental shelf to encompass the majority of, or
the entire continental margin. I argue that the geological continental
margin is more representative of the regions described in Article 76 and
Part VI. Accordingly, for the purposes of this paper, I will use the
phrase "continental margin" in lieu of the "judicial continental shelf."
UNCLOS, Article 76(4) prescribes that where the geographical
continental margin extends past 200 NM from the baselines of the
coastal State17 either by;
(i) a line delineated in accordance with paragraph 718 by
reference to the outermost fixed points at each of which the
thickness of sedimentary rocks is at least 1 percent of the
shortest distance from such point to the foot of the
continental slope; or (ii) a line delineated in accordance with
paragraph 7 by reference to fixed points not more than 60
nautical miles from the foot of the continental slope[...]19
the fixed points drawn according to UNCLOS, Article 76(4) shall not
exceed 350 NM from the baselines that the breadth of the territorial sea
is measured, or 100 NM from the 2,500 meter isobath,20 not including
the natural submarine elevations that are components of the continental
margin.21 The breadth of the judicial continental shelf is unilaterally
determined by the coastal State.22
The interplay between the legal and geographical definition of
the continental shelf is important to coastal States that may have
potential geographical advantages and disadvantages where seabed
subsoil exploitation is concerned. For example, along the rim of the
Pacific Ocean, the continental margins are usually narrow and steep,
1 Id. art. 76(4)(a) ("[F]rom where the breadth of the territorial sea is measured [ ... ]").
1 Id. art. 76(7) ("The coastal State shall delineate the outer limits of its continental shelf,
where that shelf extends beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the
breadth of the territorial sea is measured, by straight lines not exceeding 60 nautical
miles in length, connecting fixed points, defined by coordinates of latitude and
longitude").
19 Id. art. 76(4)(a)(i)-(ii).
20 Id. art. 76(5).
21 Id. art. 76(6) (noting that submarine elevations that are natural components of the
continental margin include plateaus, rises, caps, banks and spurs).
22 Id. art. 76(8).
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and the continental rise is usually poorly developed or non-existent.23
In contrast, the rim of the Atlantic Ocean, the continental margin is
usually broad, with low gradient sloping and well-developed
continental rises.24 These differences in margin formations are
important when considering issues of deepwater hydrocarbon potential
and transboundary deposits between a coastal State's continental
margin and the Area. Coastal States that have continental margins
similar to those of the Pacific rim may not have to concern themselves
as much over deepwater hydrocarbon exploration and exploitation;
however, this may not be the case with coastal States on the Atlantic
rim.
IV. THE AREA: LEGAL CONSTRUCTION AND CONSIDERATION OF
HYDROCARBON POTENTIAL WITHIN THE AREA
Part XI of UNCLOS deals with the Area. The Area is not a
geological region so much as a legally created "area" under UNCLOS
that encompasses most of the deep seabed. UNCLOS defines the Area
as the regions of the seabed that exist beyond a State's national
jurisdiction as established by Article 76 of UNCLOS.25 Geographically,
the Area is the seabed that States cannot, or do not, claim sovereignty
over that exists past their seabed/continental margin as determined by
Article 76.26 Sovereignty of the Area is reserved to the Authority.27 No
State may claim sovereignty or sovereign rights over any part of the
Area or its resources, and no claim, "nor such appropriation" by a State,
shall be recognized in the Area.28 The Area and its resources have been
deemed by UNCLOS as the "common heritage of mankind."29
Activities in the Area shall be carried out for the benefit of mankind as a
23 Larry James Doyle, Continental Margin, BRITANNICA ACADEMIC EDITION, (Nov. 20,
2011), http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/135007/continental-margin.
24 Id.
2 5 UNCLOS, supra note 13, art. 1(1); UNCLOS, supra note 13, at art. 76.
26 UNCLOS, supra note 13, art. 76.
27 UNCLOS, supra note 13, at art. 137(2). See also UNCLOS, supra note 13, at art. 152
et seq. ("The Authority is the organization through which States Parties shall, in
accordance with this Part, organize and control activities in the Area, particularly with a
view to administering the resources of the Area.").
28 UNCLOS, supra note 13, art. 137(1).
29 UNCLOS, supra note 13, art. 136.
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whole,30 irrespective of the location of the States- landlocked or
coastal-taking into "particular consideration" the interests and needs
of developing States.31
When considering the reach of the legal regime of the Area, one
needs to determine the statutory reach of Part XI on hydrocarbon
potential within that region. As stated above, a continental shelf formed
from passive margins has a lower rate of descent into the abyssal plain
compared to that formed from active margins that have steep
descents.32 According to Article 76, where the continental shelf extends
past 200 NM, the continental shelf may expand either to 350 NM from
the baselines, or 100 NM from the 2,500 meter isobath.33 Hence, longer
sloping continental shelves, as in passive margins, possess a larger area
for exploration, and are more conducive to the geological factors
favoring hydrocarbon formation. In active margins, as the continental
shelf descends rapidly into the deep seabed, the geological factors for
hydrocarbon formation are located closer to the basins of the coastal
State. As the average continental shelf does not extend past 200 NM, the
possibility of exploitable hydrocarbons in the Area, or transboundary
hydrocarbons, is rather low. Irrespective of the low possibility of
exploitable hydrocarbons, the Authority holds the rights of these
minerals and their exploitation in the Area,34 which shall be discussed
below.
V. A BRIEF BACKGROUND ON UNCLOS, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL
LAW, AND RELEVANT CONSIDERATIONS PERTAINING TO THE
CONTINENTAL SHELF
The initial precepts of UNCLOS's regime of the judicial
continental shelf originated from President Truman's Continental Shelf
Proclamation of 1945 ("Truman Proclamation"). The Truman
Proclamation effectively stated that in light of the need for new sources
of petroleum and other minerals, the United States regarded "the
natural resources of the subsoil and seabed of the continental shelf
30 UNCLOS, supra note 13, art. 138.
31 UNCLOS, supra note 13, art. 140(1).
32 Doyle, supra note 23.
33 UNCLOS, supra note 13, art. 76(1), (5).
34 UNCLOS, supra note 13, at art. 137(2)-(3).
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beneath the high seas but contiguous to the coasts of the United States
as appertaining to the United States, subject to its jurisdiction and
control [....]"35 This proclamation, which prompted other coastal States
to claim sovereignty over their continental shelves, has been credited by
the International Court of Justice as "the starting point of the positive
law" regarding the continental shelf.36 In 1953, the United States passed
the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, which was enacted to regulate
the exploitation of the United States continental shelf. From there, other
coastal States followed.37
In 1958, the Convention on the Continental Shelf followed in
suit with the Truman Proclamation, and expressed that coastal States
would have sovereign rights over their continental shelf in regard to
exploration and exploitation of the natural resources of the continental
shelf's soil and subsoil.38 These rights were limited, however, to 1)
where the water reached 200 meters in depth outside of the coastal
State's territorial sea, or 2) where technology would allow exploitation
of natural resources.39 UNCLOS established more concrete boundaries
with respect to States' rights over the judicial continental shelf.
UNCLOS states that coastal States have the exclusive right to exploit
and explore their continental shelf, and that these rights are not
dependent on actual exploration or exploitation, or any assertion of
rights.40 A State may not explore or exploit living or mineral resources
from another coastal State's continental margin without the coastal
State's consent.41 However, should a coastal State exploit non-living
resources from the continental shelf beyond 200 NM of its baseline, it
must pay or contribute a percentage of value, or volume of the
production at the site, to the Authority.42
35 Exec. Order No. 9633, 4 C.F.R. 39 (1945 Supp.)
36 North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G../Den; F.R.G/ Neth.) 1969 I.C.J. n. 47 (Feb. 20)
[hereinafter Shelf Cases].
37 See U.N. Legislative Series, Supplement to Laws and Regulations of the Regime of the
High Seas, 3-18, ST/LEG/SER. B/8 (1959).
38 U.N. Convention on the Continental Shelf, Apr. 29, 1958, 499 U.N.T.S. 311, art. 1-2
[hereinafter Convention on the Continental Shell].
39 Convention on the Continental Shelf, supra note 37, art. 1.
40 UNCLOS, supra note 13, art. 77.
41 UNCLOS, supra note 13, art. 81.
42 UNCLOS, supra note 13, art. 82(1)(2) (the payment schedule requires that after the
first five years of production a State shall pay/contribute one percent of the value or
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VI. COASTAL STATES AND THE CONTINENTAL SELF: A DISCUSSION OF
RIGHTS UNDER UNCLOS
UNCLOS provisions detail States' rights with respect to
particular international maritime matters. Some of these provisions
must be relied upon when coastal States explore and/or exploit their
continental margins. Part VI of UNCLOS defines the judicial
continental shelf, as-well-as States' rights in regards to the regime of the
judicial continental shelf.43 Specifically, it enumerates States' rights with
respect to the exploitation of the soil and subsoil of their continental
margin, their interests in their continental margin against neighboring
coastal States and vice versa, and against landlocked States.44 This
section will focus on Article 81 and Article 85, and will address coastal
States' rights to exploit their own continental margins vis-a-vis other
coastal States.
A. Rights of Coastal States to Exploit the Subsoil of Their
Continental Margins
1. Article 81: The Drilling Provision
Article 81 states that coastal States "shall have the exclusive
right to authorize and regulate drilling on the continental shelf for all
purposes."45 Along with the rights granted under Article 77, the coastal
State has the ability to prevent other States from exploiting
hydrocarbon deposits in the subsoil of its continental shelf. These
articles prohibit States from directly drilling or directionally drilling4 6
into coastal States' subsoil for hydrocarbon exploitation, or drawing
hydrocarbons from the subsoil of a coastal State by other means
without permission.47 Effectively, Articles 81 and 77 establish a
volume of the production, with each year an increase of one percent until six years and a
maximum of seven percent thereafter).
43 UNCLOS, supra note 13, art. 76, 77, 81, 85.
44 UNCLOS, supra note 13, art. 77, 85.
45 UNCLOS, supra note 13, art. 81.
46 Colloquially known as "slant drilling."
47 As an aside to this, slant drilling on terra firma is typically frowned upon and has lead
to international conflict, i.e. Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990.
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potential "veto" by the coastal State over a sponsoring State.48 If
UNCLOS stopped here, it would seem that there is a general
prohibition from drilling activities that affect the sovereign rights
granted to coastal States under Part VI. However, there may be a
potential exception to Articles 77 and 81. The wording of Article 85, the
"tunnelling provision" of UNCLOS, could be perceived as creating an
exception to the enumerated rights in Part VI of UNCLOS that could
also potentially affect the application of Part XI.
2. Article 85: The Tunnelling Provision
The most striking issue that must be addressed when
discussing the rights of coastal States in regards to transboundary
marine subsoil hydrocarbon deposits is the tunnelling provision. Article
85 indicates that "[t]his Part does not prejudice the right of the coastal
State to exploit the subsoil by means of tunnelling, irrespective of the
depth of water above the subsoil." This raises two interesting questions:
1) what is the difference between the definitions of "tunnelling" and
"drilling" as used within UNCLOS; and 2) what are the rights of coastal
States in regards to these terms? One issue to consider is whether
Article 85 grants an exception to the requirement from Article 77
pertaining to the rights of coastal States over their natural resources in
the subsoil of their continental margin. If this is the case, then the
purpose of Article 81 should be questioned. Another issue to consider is
whether Article 85 raises an exception to Article 78(2), which states that
in exercising its rights, a coastal State must not infringe or interfere with
the rights and freedoms of other States. Unequivocally, we can discern
that Article 85 is not designed to raise an exception to Article 78(2), nor
should it be construed to do so.
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
("Vienna Convention") states that " [a] treaty shall be interpreted in
good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to the terms of the
treaty in their context and in light of its objective and purpose."49 Since
"tunnelling" and "drilling" are dealt with separately in UNCLOS, it
appears that the terms are to be considered distinct from each other in
48 See UNCLOS, supra note 13, at 78-79; See also UNCLOS, supra note 13, at 148-49.
49 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, art. 31
[hereinafter Vienna Convention].
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terms of definition and intended effect. Therefore, the two terms must
have different meanings and intended effects in regards to their usage,
and Articles 81 and 85 are likely concerned with manifestly different
issues.
Under the Vienna Convention a State must act in good faith
and in accordance with the ordinary meanings of the words within a
treaty.o The ordinary meaning of "tunnelling," according to the Oxford
Dictionary is to "dig or force a passage underground or through
something."51 The verb "tunnelling" is derived from the noun "tunnel,"
which means "an artificial underground passage, [especially] one built
through a hill or under a building, road, or river." 52 The ordinary
meaning of "drilling" is "to make a hole in or through something by
using a drill."53 It is derived from the noun "drill," which is a tool or
machine with a rotating cutting tip, reciprocating hammer, or chisel
used for making holes.54 Considering the use of "tunnelling" and
"drilling" in UNCLOS, under these definitions alone "tunnelling"
could be "drilling" depending on the methods used to create an
underground passage in the subsoil of the continental margin.
If "tunnelling" could in fact be drilling, then the question as to
why Article 85 was not consolidated within Article 81 arises. A relevant
and important distinction is the technical approach of the
exploration/exploitation, which may begin on the surface of water or
from terra firma and down into the subsoil of the coastal State's
continental margin. Therefore, in order to properly address this issue
the geographical/physical origin and direction of the
exploratory/exploitative activity should be considered. Following this
line of analysis, the major distinguishing factor between the terms lies
in the wording of the articles and potentially in the history of Article 85.
With respect to its wording, Article 81 clearly states that a coastal State
has the exclusive right to authorize and regulate drilling on its
continental shelf for all purposes.55 The word "on" is the operative
50 Id.
5 1 NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTONARY 1863 (3d ed. 2010).
52 Id. (the word tunnel is commonly used to denote a man made passage through a
geographical obstacle for the expeditious passage of vehicles, persons, and/or cargoes).
53 NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTONARY 529 (3d ed. 2010).
54 Id.
55UNCLOS, supra note 13, art. 81.
56 . 22
2014 DEEPWATER TRANSBOUNDARY HYDROCARBONS
distinction here, which differentiates the scope of each article. The word
"on" implies an exclusively top-down approach to the drilling activities
that are being controlled; while, the "right to exploit" language in
Article 85 is more directionally flexible. Despite this flexibility, the term
"tunnelling" in Article 85 must conform to the definition of a tunnel in
some respect, and cannot be taken out of the context of its typical usage
- which is a passage to bypass an obstacle. However, since the
supporting language of Article 85 does not directly suggest
"tunnelling" must be in response to certain types of obstacles or for
resource exploitation,56 the concept of an "obstacle" should be applied
to a geographical or geological hindrance to an interest that a coastal
State has in its continental margin.
In order to determine whether this interpretation of the
tunnelling provision is correct, it is important to look at the drafting
history of Article 85 along with the surrounding circumstances at the
time it was drafted. If under Article 31 of the Vienna Convention an
interpretation would be "ambiguous or obscure" or "manifestly absurd
or unreasonable,"57 then pursuant to Article 32 of the Vienna
Convention supplementary means of interpretation may be used in
applying Article 31. UNCLOS does not explicitly define "tunnelling" or
"drilling," and the ordinary meanings of both terms are ambiguous.
One cannot deduce the intended meaning of these terms within the
context of their use, and should Article 85 be taken to its logical
extreme, it would impermissibly frustrate Part VI and Part XI of
UNCLOS. Therefore, applying Article 32 of the Vienna Convention is
appropriate in this instance to determine the meaning of "tunnelling"
and "drilling."
Article 85 grants a coastal State the right to exploit the subsoil
by means of tunnelling, irrespective of the depth of the water above it.58
This extremely broad allowance is not compatible with the regime of
sovereignty over the continental margin expressed in Part VI and the
benefit of humanity language in Part XI. Since Article 85 is the
descendent of Article 7 of the Convention on the Continental Shelf of
1958, the wording of the predecessor article may shed some light as to
56 For example, if Article 85 was written in such a way that would allow subsoil projects
such as the Channel Tunnel.
Vienna Convention, supra note 45, art. 32.
UNCLOS, supra note 13, art. 85.
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the scope of Article 85.59 Article 85 states "[t]he provisions of these
articles shall not prejudice the right of the coastal State to exploit the
subsoil by means of tunnelling irrespective of the depth of water above
the subsoil."60 When comparing the wording of Article 7 and Article 85,
it appears that both articles serve a similar purpose in the context of
their respective conventions. Within the Convention on the Continental
Shelf, Article 7 appears to distinguish Articles 1 and 2 by expressing
that the coastal State has the right to tunnel from terra firma to exploit
"the subsoil of the high seas."61 The word "exploit" does not modify an
object, such as natural resources or minerals, and can be read as a broad
or narrow allowance for non-resource based exploitation. The term
"tunnel" takes on a specific meaning of a particular activity when
considering the context of its use in the International Law Committee's
("ILC") Commentary of its Eighth Session 1956 ("ILC Commentary"),
and the history of deep sea hydrocarbon exploitation. Paragraph 11 of
the ILC Commentary on proposed Article 67 states:
[...] the Commission points out that it does not intend
limiting the exploitation of the subsoil of the high seas by
means of tunnels, cuttings or wells dug from terra firma.
Such exploitation of the subsoil of the high seas by a coastal
State is not subject to any legal limitation by reference to the
depth of the superjacent waters.62
As used in the ILC Commentary, the term "tunnels" is distinct from the
terms "cuttings" and "wells." With respect to the manner in which the
ILC Commentary was drafted, it appears that the drafters intended
"cuttings" and "wells" to be related terms referring to accepted oil
drilling activities/techniques at the time of its drafting. This
interpretation of the ILC Commentary is acceptable because the Oxford
Dictionary definition of "drill" includes a "cutting machine," and the
act of "cutting" could logically incorporate certain types of drilling
techniques. For example, the use of an auger, or a mechanically similar
59 U.N. Convention on the Continental Shelf, supra note 38, art. 7.
60 See U.N. Convention on the Continental Shelf, supra note 37, at 318.
61 int'l Law Comm'n, Articles Concerning the Law of the Sea with Commentary, [1956]
2 Y.B. INT'L COMM'N, at 296 [hereinafter Articles Concerning the Law of the Sea].
62 d.
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motion, would be a form of "cutting." On the other hand, "tunnelling"
and well digging are activities that can be undergone by "drilling," or
other similar excavation techniques. If this is the case, a similar situation
to the Article 81 and 85 verbiage conundrum could occur.
The most important difference between "drilling" and
"tunnelling," as gleaned from the ILC Commentary, is that "tunnelling"
can presumably start from the coastal State's terra firma and continue
into its continental margin. This particular characteristic of "tunnelling"
is expressed by the ILC Commentary of its Eighth Session 1956. The
history of the development of deep sea oil drilling and the ILC
Commentary of its Eighth Session 1956 indicates that coastal States
were interested in extending the reach of their sovereign rights over
their continental margin past he 200 meter depth to "where the depth
of the superjacent waters admits [the] exploitation of the natural
resources of the seabed and subsoil."63 Further, the ILC found that
technological advancements in the future might make it possible to
exploit resources past the depth of 200 meters.M However, the ILC
Commentary of the proposed Article 67, which later became integrated
into Article 1 of the Convention on the Continental Shelf, makes no
mention of "tunnelling" except for paragraph 11 where "tunnelling" is
used exclusively in the context of an activity conducted from terra
firma. Therefore, I believe that Article 85 is merely a renmant of the
Convention on the Continental Shelf, expressing a coastal States' right
to conduct exploratory/exploitative activities from terra firma into the
subsoil of its seabed without infringing upon the rights of neighboring
and adjacent coastal States. Therefore, the right to tunnel within
UNCLOS should not be read as an exception to the rights guaranteed to
coastal States under Part VI.
VII. THE AREA'S KEEPER, THE AUTHORITY
The Authority is the intergovernmental organization ("IGO")
that oversees the Area.65 As stated previously, the Area is the area
ocean floor that is not controlled by the coastal States under Part VI.66
63 Articles Concerning the Law of the Sea, supra note 53, at 296.
64 Id.
65 UNCLOS, supm note 13, art. 136(2).
66 UNCLOS, supra note 13, art. 1(1).
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Coastal States that want to establish the boundaries of their continental
margins under Part VI of UNCLOS are not affected by Part XI. Nor is
the validity of delimitation agreements between States affected by Part
XI.67 The Authority is granted all the rights for the natural resources in
the Area, and it shall act on behalf of mankind.68 The Authority
regulates exploration and exploitation of in situ minerals found in the
Area.69 Resources in the Area are not subject to alienation, and
recovered minerals may only be alienated in accordance with Part XI
and the rules, regulations and procedures of the Authority.70 Under
UNCLOS Article 157, the Authority is the organization that State
parties, in accordance with Part XI shall go through to organize and
control activities in the Area.71 The organization and control of the
activities in the Area by the Authority should be with a view to
administer the resources of the Area.72 The powers and functions of the
Authority are expressly enumerated by UNCLOS, and the Authority
shall also have "incidental powers" that are implicit and necessary for it
to conduct its enumerated powers and functions.73
The Authority, as it is not a State, does not have sovereign
powers based on customary international law. However, it does have
powers granted to it by UNCLOS, subsequent annexes, implementation
agreements, and protocols. In the territory of each State party under
UNCLOS, subject to ratification, the Authority enjoys the privileges and
immunities set forth in section 4, subsection G of Part XI.74 UNCLOS
grants the Authority an international legal personality and the legal
67 UNLCOS, supra note 13, art. 134(4) ("Nothing in this article affects the
establishment of the outer limits of the continental shelf in accordance with Part VI or
the validity of agreements relating to delimitation between States with opposite or
adjacent coasts.").
68 UNCLOS, supra note 13, art. 137(2).
69 UNCLOS, supra note 13, art. 133(a) (Minerals includes "all solid, liquid, or gaseous
mineral resources ... in the Area at or beneath the seabed.").
70UNCLOS, supra note 13, art. 137. It should be noted that UNCLOS uses the words
"resources" and "minerals" to denote different phases of exploitation. Resources means
"all solid, liquid, or gaseous mineral resources in situ in the Area at or beneath the sea-
bed...." Minerals means resources that have been recovered from the Area; UNCLOS,
supra note 13, at. 133.
71 UNCLOS, supra note 13, at. 157.
72 UNCLOS, supra note 13, art. 157(1).
73 UNCLOS, supra note 13, art. 157(2).
74 UNCLOS, supra note 13, art. 177.
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capacity necessary to exercise its functions and fulfill its purposes.75 The
Authority has legal immunity from suit unless it waives this right.76 The
general conduct of States towards the Area, which is administered by
the Authority, shall conform with Part XI of the convention and other
principles of international law, with an eye towards maintaining peace
and security, and promoting international coordination and mutual
understanding.7 Further, the Authority must conduct activities in the
Area with regard to the rights and legitimate interests of any coastal
State where resource deposits lie across the limits of national
jurisdiction.78
VIII. HYDROCARBONS IN THE AREA: WHAT IS THE PROTOCOL?
Typically, coastal States have enacted domestic legislation on
the exploration and exploitation of subsoil resources of their continental
margins, even if they are not a party to UNCLOS. While the Area has
expressed protocols in regards to exploitation of certain enumerated
resources, none specifically deal with hydrocarbon exploitation. Instead
of a full-fledged hydrocarbon protocol, there exists Article 151(9).79 This
article states that the Authority has the power to limit the level of
minerals exploited from the Area, other than polymetallic nodules,
under the conditions and methods as may be appropriate by adapting
regulations in accordance with Article 161(8).80 According to UNCLOS,
however, minerals recovered from the Area may only be alienated in
accordance with Part XI and the rules, regulations and procedures of
the Authority.81 Since "minerals" comprises all in situ liquid and
gaseous minerals, including hydrocarbons, this implies that coastal
States may not exploit transboundary hydrocarbons in the Area until
either rules, regulations, and procedures are developed by the
Authority, or some other form of negotiation or contract between a
coastal State and the Authority is agreed upon. The issue of uncertainty
is compounded by the fact that exploration and exploitation may not be
75 UNCLOS, supra note 13, art. 176.
76 UNCLOS, supra note 13, art. 178.
n UNCLOS, supra note 13, art. 138.
7UNCLOS, supra note 13, art. 142().
UNCLOS, supra note 13, art. 151(9).
so UNCLOS, supra note 13, art. 161(8).
s' UNCLOS, supra note 13, art. 137(2).
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conducted unless the plans are approved by the Authority and
undertaken by the Enterprise.82
Effectively, the fact that no explicit rules or protocols exists
under UNCLOS on hydrocarbons may dissuade States from seeking to
exploit the Area until such rules and protocols, or other agreements, are
put into place by the Authority. As the resources of the Area are meant
to be for the benefit of mankind, it would make sense to prevent States
from exploiting common hydrocarbon pools until protocols are
developed. Although I will not attempt to explicitly posit the
particulars on the types of regulations that the Authority could draft, I
imagine that they would be similar to the regulations and requirements
set for the polymetallic nodules.83 I also imagine the profit calculus of
hydrocarbons in the Area would be similar to a standard unitization
agreement, with the percentage payout being based on the percent of
the volume of the subsoil hydrocarbons within the territory of the
respective parties. Irrespective of any uncertainty, I shall consider and
discuss possible issues of hydrocarbon exploitation within UNCLOS
despite the lack of an express protocol, and attempt to address the
potential issues that could arise.
IX. ARTICLE 85 AND ITS POTENTIAL IMPACT ON THE AREA
While Article 85 may be troublesome within Part VI, it does not
apply when a coastal State deals with the Area. Article 137 effectively
negates the tunnelling provision by stating that no State may claim or
exercise sovereignty or sovereign rights over the Area.84 Further, the
resources of the Area are not subject to alienation unless it is in
accordance with Part XI.85 Effectively, Part VI expresses rights that
coastal states have with respect to each other, but does not affect the
Authority's rights to the resources within the Area. Therefore, Part VI's
exploitation rights only concern coastal State relations with other States,
and Part XI expressly limits State's rights under Part VI vis-A-vis the
Area.
82 UNCLOS, supra note 13, art. 153.
83 See UNCLOS, supra note 13, at Amex III.
84 UNCLOS, supra note 13, art. 137(1).
UNCLOS, supra note 13, art. 137(2).
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X. ARTICLE 78 (2) AND ARTICLE 142: A CONFLICT OF LAW?
An interesting issue arises over the interplay of Article 78(2)
and Article 142(1). Article 78(2) states that " [t]he exercise of the rights of
the coastal State over the continental shelf must not infringe or result in
any unjustifiable interference with navigation and other rights and
freedoms of other States as provided for in this Convention." This is an
effective right to veto by coastal States against other coastal States
within Part VI. Notwithstanding other parts of UNCLOS, this
prohibition is rather direct and does not seem to warrant further
discussion as to its application. However, the interplay between it and
Article 142 of Part XI seems to create a bit of confusion.
Article 142(1) states that, "[a]ctivities in the Area, with respect
to resource deposits in the Area which lie across limits of national
jurisdiction, shall be conducted with due regard to the rights and
legitimate interests of any coastal State across whose jurisdiction such
deposits lie." Article 142(2) states that " [i]n cases where activities in the
Area may result in the exploitation of resources lying within national
jurisdiction, the prior consent of the coastal State concerned shall be
required." When comparing Article 78 to Article 142, an interesting
question arises regarding resource exploitation: does Article 78(2)
frustrate the purpose Article 142? This question is especially important
where hydrocarbons are concerned, as hydrocarbons pool and an entire
deposit may be completely exploited from a single site.
For example, imagine a hydrocarbon deposit that lies across a
sponsor State's continental margin, the Area, and a coastal State's
continental margin. The sponsor State has made the appropriate
arrangements with the Authority and may now conduct exploitation
activities in its continental margin and the Area. However, the coastal
State does not agree to it and is not a party to the agreement on the
common pool exploitation between the sponsor State and the
Authority, and therefore, uses its veto under Article 142. Under this
scenario, a coastal State preventing the exploitation of its subsoil
resources is also preventing a sponsor State's exploitation of its
continental shelf in violation of Article 78(2). Is this a fair result?
Article 142, in relation to hydrocarbons, is meant to prevent the
bypassing of the sovereign rights of coastal States granted under Part VI
through the Authority, or another party, and acts as a deterrent for
sponsor States from conducting exploitation activities before reaching
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all necessary multilateral agreements. Yet, in situations involving
common pools of liquid or gaseous hydrocarbon deposits, Article 142
could be used in bad faith86 by a coastal State, or serve as political
leverage by the coastal State against the sponsor State who is
conducting exploitation activities within the Area. In essence, this
behavior would prevent the sponsor State from exploiting its own
continental margin as well. Like Article 142, Article 78(2) states that a
sponsor State may not exploit the resources of a coastal State unless the
coastal State consents.87 Article 78(2) can be viewed as dealing with
special issues that arise with common pools of liquid and gaseous
hydrocarbon deposits.88 The fugitive nature of these deposits warrants
more protection than static deposits, as static deposits cannot be
exploited by activities that are physically in a different geographical
region. Article 142's veto power essentially restates the rights of coastal
States under Part VI.
The independent veto provisions of Articles 78(2) and 142 work
in tandem and seek to effectively facilitate agreements between States
that share a common gaseous or liquid hydrocarbon subsoil deposit,
prior to any exploitation. Article 142 is utilized where Authority action
is involved in an agreement to exploit a common pool. Article 78(2)'s
language is a broader prohibition against the actions of sponsor States
breaching the "other rights and freedoms of other States as provided for
in this Convention" through any method.89 The result of the interplay
between Articles 78(2) and 142 is acceptable, because it conforms with
the sentiment expressed within Article 77(2). Further, this result is also
acceptable under Article 32 of the Vienna Convention because it does
not serve to frustrate the purpose of UNCLOS. 90
86 See UNCLOS, supra note 13, art. 300. This could be in spite of UNCLOS Article
300's requirement for States to act in good faith, and to not conunit an abuse of right.
UNCLOS, supra note 13, art. 78(2).
See also UNCLOS, supra note 13, art. 77(2) ("[The sovereign rights a coastal State
exercises over the continental shelf] are exclusive in the sense that if the coastal State
does not explore the continental shelf or exploit its natural resources, no one may
undertake these activities without the express consent of the coastal State.").
UNCLOS, supra note 13, art. 78(2).
90 Vienna Convention, supra note 42, art. 32.
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XI. MAKING THE DEAL: CONSIDERATIONS FOR AVENUES OF AGREEMENT
AMONG STATES, AND STATES AND THE AUTHORITY
The following sections deal with potential agreement structures
between coastal States, and the Authority. I will look at the ways that
coastal States could possibly extend their continental margins, either
using UNCLOS or other methods, and discuss the possible means that
interested parties could reach agreements over hydrocarbon
exploitation. The power of the Authority over the Area is not unlimited,
and coastal States may have the ability to change their continental
margins, thus affecting the boundaries of the Area. As stated
previously, Part VI of UNCLOS enumerates the rights of coastal States
over their continental margins; Article 134(4) may provide coastal States
with the ability to expand their judicial continental shelf against the
Area. Article 134(4) states that " [n]othing in this article affects the
establishment of the outer limits of the continental shelf in accordance
with Part VI or the validity of agreements relating to delimitation
between States with opposite or adjacent coasts."91 Therefore, Article 76
and Article 77 are not affected by Article 134 and Article 1(1), and
coastal States have the power to adjust the jurisdiction of the Authority.
The potential methods coastal States may use to increase the breath of
their continental margins deserves special consideration, as expanding
the judicial continental shelf 1) may allow for a higher probability of
discovering subsoil hydrocarbons; 2) could be used as leverage in
negotiations for unitization and delimitation agreements; and 3) could
be employed as a method to stymie States' exploitation agreements
with the Authority in the Area.
A. Coastal States May Extend Their Continental
Margins under Part VI
Coastal States can control to a certain extent he breadth of their
continental margins, prior, during, or after ratification of UNCLOS, and
can thus effectively alter the reach of the Authority by changing the
dimensions of the Area.92 Further, coastal States may also challenge the
breadth of the continental shelves of adjacent coastal states.93
9 UNCLOS, supra note 13, art. 134(4).
92 UNCLOS, supra note 13, art. 76(7)-(10).
93 See generally UNCLOS, supra note 13, art. 279-99.
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Interestingly enough, there is no express prohibition under UNCLOS of
coastal States altering their judicial continental shelf to become more
favorable for resource exploitation.94 Article 76(7)-(9) does not construct
any boundary estoppel, nor does Annex II of UNCLOS,95 and creates a
potential tool for coastal States to use to their own benefit. However, it
is unlikely coastal States have not already taken full advantage of
Article 76, especially since Article 76(4)(a)(i) is written in such a way to
allow coastal States to claim continental margins with optimal subsoil
conditions for hydrocarbon formation.96
This potential geographical gerrymandering creates a potential
strategy to gain advantages in negotiations in regard to subsoil
hydrocarbons. What happens if a State declares a judicial continental
shelf that does not completely accord with Article 76(8) and Articles 7
and 8 of Annex II, and then pursues an extended exchange with the
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf? What would then
be the legal status of the coastal State's continental margin? There is
nothing within UNCLOS that states that judicial continental shelves
that are not in conformity with Article 76 will be held as ineffective
until properly revised. In fact, UNCLOS states that the limits of the
judicial continental shelf shall be unilaterally established by a coastal
State, although made on the basis of the recommendations of the
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, and shall be final
and binding.97 Yet, there is no language in UNCLOS, or its Annexes,
stipulating that a State must take into account the totality of the
Commission's recommendations when declaring the margins of its
94 For an in depth discussion See MARK J. VALENCIA ET AL., SHARING THE RESOURCES
OF THE SOUTH CHINA SEA, pp. 17-76 (1st ed. 1999) (discussing issues pertaining to
different claims to the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea).
Amex II sets forth the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, an organ
that gives technical support and recommendations to Coastal states claiming continental
shelves past 200 NM pursuant o Art. 76(8).
96 Article 76(4)(a)(i) reads, "(a) For the purposes of this Convention, the coastal State
shall establish the outer edge of the continental margin wherever the margin extends
beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial
sea is measured, by either: (i) a line delineated in accordance with paragraph 7 by
reference to the outermost fixed points at each of which the thickness of sedimentary
rocks is at least 1 per cent of the shortest distance from such point to the foot of the
continental slope[.]"
97 UNCLOS, supra note 13, art. 76(8).
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judicial continental shelf. The only expressly binding language states
that a coastal State must follow the limitations set forth under Article
76(4)-(6).98 However, non-cooperation with the Commission could lead
to other issues concerning potentially affected neighboring coastal
States, resulting in binding arbitration and the redrawing of coastal
margins and the continental shelf pursuant to Article 76.99
If a coastal State's judicial continental shelf under UNLOS does
not comport with Annex II and Part VI, it does not mean that the
coastal State has no sovereign rights over its geographical continental
margin. Under customary international law, coastal State's sovereignty
over the continental margin would reach a breadth of at least 200 NM,
not withstanding other entitlements under UNCLOS.0o This type of
tactic may also be at odds with Article 300 of UNCLOS, which provides
that " [p]arties shall fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed under
this Convention and shall exercise the rights, jurisdiction and freedoms
recognized in this Convention in a manner which would not constitute
an abuse of right."101 Despite this, there is no mention of any punitive
mechanism for non-compliance with the Committee on the Limits of
the Continental Shelf. As a result, a coastal State should be mindful of
"bad faith" finagling with multilateral treaties because other States may
be weary to deal with them in the future. Further, a coastal State
planning to alter its judicial continental shelf should also be aware of all
possible issues in relation to Part VI and Part XI.
B. Dispute Settlement: Considerations and Concerns
If a delimitation agreement issue arises between coastal States,
the matter can be taken to the International Court of Justice ("ICJ"), the
International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea ("ITLOS"), the Seabed
Disputes Chamber, or any other tribunal that has jurisdiction.102 Part
XV of UNCLOS deals with the settlement of disputes between States
Parties, and Part XI, Section 5, of UNCLOS deals with the settlement of
" UNCLOS, supra note 13, art. 76(2).
9 See also Dispute Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary Between
Bangladesh and Myanmar in the Bay of Bengal (Bangl./Myan.), Case No. 16, Judgment
of Mar. 14, 2012, 12 ITLOS Rep.4 [hereinafter Dispute Judgment].
100 Id
1o UNCLOS, supra note 13, art. 300.
102 UNCLOS, supra note 13, art. 83, 186, 286.
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disputes between States Parties and the Authority. While dispute
settlement is not entirely within the scope of the question of "what
kinds of agreements could coastal States make," it is somewhat
important in considering stratagem for making, or not making,
agreements. Party States, as well as non-party States, to UNCLOS
should want to seriously consider the language in their delimitation
agreements, unitization agreements, correlative seabed agreements, or
anything of the like. If adjacent coastal States are having a dispute over
the breadth of their respective continental margins and are doing so
without any delimitation agreements in force, then the dispute may
undergo binding settlement that grants an equitable solution under
UNCLOS.0o While redrawing of margin lines by a third party may be
helpful to coastal States that have reached an impasse, it is important
that coastal States protect their continental margin interests by a prior
non-arbitral delimitation agreement.104
In The Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania v.
Ukraine), a prior delimitation agreement between Romania and the
Union of Socialist Soviet Republics (U.S.S.R.) regarding a marine rock in
proximity to Ukraine was held to still be effective when the ICJ
determined the coastal States' maritime delimitation.105 Coastal States
must be wary of agreements made prior to ratification of UNCLOS, as
Article 83(4) states that " [w]here there is an agreement in force between
the States concerned, questions relating to the delimitation of the
continental shelf shall be determined in accordance with the provisions
of that agreement."106 Therefore, if a coastal State that is the party to a
delimitation agreement wishes to acquire more seabed under UNCLOS,
the delimitation issue must also be resolved in terms of the agreement
in force between the parties prior to a tribunal's determination of the
new boundaries. Another important consideration to be made is the
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf and the Authority
must not affect delimitation agreements between States with opposite
103 UNCLOS, supra note 13, art. 83(1); see also Dispute Judgment, 12 ITLOS Rep. 4.
104 See Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Rom. v. Ukr.), 2009 I.C.J. 61 (Feb. 3)
(The ICJ found a prior delimitation agreement to still be effective in a maritime
delimitation dispute between coastal States).
105 Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Rom. v. Ukr.), 2009 I.C.J. 61, 119 (Feb. 3).
106UNCLOS, supra note 13, art. 83(4).
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or adjacent coasts.107 Hence, State agreements effectively carry weight
over the organs created by UNCLOS.
In a recent judgment by ITLOS, Dispute Concerning
Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary Between Bangladesh and
Myanmar in the Bay of Bengal, the Tribunal discussed the application
of UNCLOS where there was a question of the delimitation of the
judicial continental shelf.108 The Tribunal considered issues pertaining
to the 200 NM breadth of the continental shelf under Article 76,
whether Bangladesh and Myanmar had entitlement to a judicial
continental shelf beyond the initial 200 NM, and whether the Tribunal
could delimit the judicial continental shelf beyond 200 NM. 109 In this
case, the Tribunal concluded that Article 77(3) confirmed the existence
of a coastal State's entitlement to the continental shelf beyond 200 NM,
and that this entitlement did not depend on the establishment of the
outer limits of the continental shelf by a coastal State.110 The Tribunal
ruled that even if the outer limits of a continental shelf have not been
determined by a coastal State, or recommended by the Commission on
the Limits of the Continental Shelf,111 it did not imply that the Tribunal
had to refrain from determining the existence of entitlement to the
continental shelf within 200 NM, nor would it prevent the Tribunal
from delimiting a continental shelf past 200 NM. 112 The Tribunal
unanimously decided that it had the jurisdiction to "[...] delimit the
maritime boundary of the territorial sea, the exclusive economic zone
and the continental shelf [...],"113 and then ruled, by twenty-one votes
to one, that it had also the jurisdiction to delimit the continental shelf
beyond 200 NM. 114
By this judgment, ITLOS notified all potential claimants that the
Tribunal has the jurisdiction to determine entitlements to the
107 UNCLOS, supra note 13, art. 76(10), 134(4); UNCLOS, supra note 13, Annex II,
art. 9.
108 See Dispute Judgment, 12 ITLOS Rep. 4.
'09 Dispute Judgment, 12 ITLOS Rep. 4, ¶¶ 399, 401.
110 Id. at ¶ 409.
.n Id. ¶ 377 ("There is nothing in the Convention or in the Rules of Procedure of the
Commission or in its practice to indicate that delimitation of the continental shelf
constitutes an impediment to the performance by the Commission of its functions.").
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continental shelf within 200 NM, as well as the limits of the continental
shelf beyond 200 NM. ITLOS, in this instance, took a positive approach
to determining the rights of the parties. It noted that, a continuing
impasse regarding the coastal States' rights prevented the
implementation of UNCLOS and would be contrary to the efficient
operation of UNCLOS, 115 and therefore, the Tribunal had a
responsibility under the Convention to resolve the issue.116 The effect of
this decision is that coastal States may risk the Tribunal demarking their
entitlements and continental shelves where an impasse exists.117
Interestingly, the Tribunal stated that "[i]t is not unusual in
such cases for States to enter into agreements or cooperative
arrangements to deal with problems resulting from the delimitation."118
This could lead an observer to believe that this instance may have been
an exceptional case, and that the Tribunal sought to warn similarly
situated parties. However, continued issues regarding the lack of
delimitation, such as with the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea,119
may lead to similar situations in the future. The Tribunal noted that
under UNCLOS Annex VI, Article 33(2), it would not make any binding
decision that would prejudice non-claimant third parties.120 The
Tribunal also noted that if the seabed of the Area was concerned within
a dispute, it would not prejudice the rights of the international
community.121 Although the Tribunal was limited in its discretion to
affect the boundary between Myanmar and Bangladesh, this judgment
11 See also id. ¶¶ 433, 434, 455, 471, 472. The Tribunal observed that "during the Third
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea the notion of natural prolongation [of
the continental shelf] was employed as a concept to lend support to the trend towards
expanding national jurisdiction over the continental margin." ¶ 433. The Tribunal noted
that the methods of delimiting the continental shelf past 200 NM were distinct from the
question of the object and the extent of the rights granted in Articles 57 and 76. ¶ 455.
However, the Tribunal also acknowledged that delimitation past 200 NM may lead to
"grey" areas that created where overlapping jurisdiction/claims to transboundary
resources exist. ¶ 472.
16 Id. 11 391-94.
117 It does not matter if coastal States have, or have not, submitted their delimitations of
their continental shelves to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, or
have not made prior agreements with neighboring coastal States pursuant o Article 311.
11" Dispute Judgment, 12 ITLOS Rep. 4, ¶ 472.
19 VALENCIA, supra note 94.
120 Dispute Judgment, 12 ITLOS Rep. 4, ¶ 367.
121 I ¶ 368.
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did not concern changes to the boundaries on the Area.122 Inasmuch,
there is still no clear answer to what would occur where a coastal State's
claims over the continental shelf were in contention with the
Authority's rights over the Area.
C. Redrafting Continental Margins: Shifting Claims
A possible "flaw" of UNCLOS is that it implicitly allows for
continued revision of continental margins by coastal States.123 Although
coastal States may face issues where delimitation agreements determine
a majority of legal margins, they still could theoretically alter areas that
are not covered by such agreements. As revisions to the continental
margins are not proscribed by UNCLOS, this tactic could be used by
coastal States in a variety of ways. A coastal State may revise its
continental margin as a potentially legitimate maneuver to gain more
exploitable territory, to shift veto power between States, or to create
leverage depending on the structure of a delimitation agreement. This
tactic could occur where judicial continental shelves are adjacent or
opposite of each other.
Another probable situation occurs where a sponsor State is
stymied by a coastal State via Article 146(1) where the coastal State
successfully altered its judicial continental Shelf to cover the seabed
where the sponsor State is facilitating exploitation/exploration with the
Authority. While this type of maneuver may have the theoretical
potential to cause an issue, it is doubtful that it actually would occur.
Depending on the maximum breadth of the continental margin allowed
under Article 76, a coastal State may not be able to gain much more
judicial continental shelf. The wording of Article 76 invites coastal
States to claim the maximum legal breath of continental margin on the
outset. What may occur, however, is an attempt to minutely extend and
hook the continental margin over hydrocarbon rich areas of a
neighboring coastal State. This could be strategically important when a
coastal State's continental margin borders, but does not intersect a
hydrocarbon deposit of a sponsoring State. In this instance, the coastal
State may seek to gain a sovereign interest over the hydrocarbon
deposit for either economic or diplomatic purposes.
122 Id
123 VALENCIA, supra note 94.
71
U. MIAMI INT'L & CoMP. L. REV V
D. Unitization Agreements: Further Considerations
for Delineation
Delimitation of transboundary resources can lead to conflicts
between coastal States in regard to the exercise of rights over subsoil
transboundary hydrocarbons. Unitization could be a legal and
diplomatic way to provide for the exploration and development of an
entire hydrocarbon area by a single operator, so that exploration and
production may proceed in the most efficient and economic manner.
Unitization agreements are agreements between States that normatively
modify the rule of capture, decreases the waste between subsoil tracts
from being drained by one or more coastal States from common pools,
and leads to a more effective exploitation.124 This type of agreement has
already been utilized in transboundary groundwater agreements.125
Additionally, the majority of continental shelf delimitation agreements
address the issue of natural resources.126 Typically, unification
production/profit agreements are based on the percentage of the
subsoil resource that each State party controls. Hence, it is imperative
that the signatory parties determine and agree to the extent that the
transboundary hydrocarbon deposit is within their continental
margin.127 If parties, States and/or IGOs, agree to unitize their interests,
cooperation throughout the unitization process is important for the
overall success of the joint exploitation operation. Unification especially
helps to relieve exploitation issues stemming from migratory subsoil
hydrocarbons. Geological variations within hydrocarbon reservoirs,
such as differences in the depth of a reservoir, can allow a State to
exploit more hydrocarbons volumetrically via optimally located
exploitation sites.128 Further, States can make arrangements for
124 See Charles Biblowit, International Law and the Allocation of Property Rights in
Common Resources, 4 N.Y. INT'L L. REv. 77, 79 (1991).
125 See Thomas A. Reynolds, Delimitation, Exploitation, and Allocation of
Transboundary Oil & Gas Deposits Between Nation-States, 1 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L.
135, 144 (1995).
126 See Alberto Sz6kely, The International Law of Submarine Transboundary
Hydrocarbon Resources: Legal Limits to Behavior and Experiences for the Gulf of
Mexico, 26 NAT. RESOURCES J. 733, 759 (1986).
127 Reynolds, supra note 107, at 149.
128 Id. at 166.
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delimitation either by diplomacy or through various forms of
international arbitration.
While there is nothing in UNCLOS about unitization
agreements, unitization-like joint venture systems have been suggested
by ICJ to State parties.129 This suggestion is significant as the ICJ has
decided many delimitation agreements between States without
factoring in issues of economic interests in natural resources.130 In the
North Sea Continental Shelf cases, the ICJ stated that the "the land
dominates the sea," and the continental shelf is the natural prolongation
of a coastal State's land territory.131 The ICJ further stated that the
natural resources of the continental shelf under delimitation "so far as
known or readily ascertainable" may be relevant enough in certain
circumstances to be reasonably considered in delimitation cases.132
However, for the most part, the ICJ has ruled that the presence of
transboundary resources is not necessary in itself to create a special
circumstance that would alter a delimitation agreement between coastal
States, and recommended that States negotiate, subsequent to
delimitation, any exploitation schemes.133 This is important to note, as
the ICJ is of the view that economic considerations or altering
delimitation lines cannot be taken primarily into account.134 The ICJ
explained that their position was due to the fact that economic
considerations are "virtually extraneous factors" since they represent
129 Agreement on the Continental Shelf between Iceland and Jan Mayen, Ice.-Nor., art.
3-5, Oct. 22, 1981, 2124 U.N.T.S. 262, 21 I.L.M. 1222 (1982).
130 UNCLOS, supra note 13, art. 83(1); Statute of the International Court of Justice art.
38(1), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 33 U.N.T.S. 993). Especially considering that under
UNCLOS Article 83(1), the tribunal with jurisdiction must effect delimitation
agreements on the basis of international law, as referred to under Article 38 of the
Statute of the International Court of Justice.
131 North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G./Den; F.R.G/Neth.) 1969 I.C.J. n. 32, 33 (Feb.
20).
132 Id.
133 See France-United Kingdom: Arbitration on the Delimitation of the Continental
Shelf, reprinted in 18 I.L.M. 397 (1979); Treaty Concerning the Lateral Delimitation of
the Continental Shelf in the Vicinity of the Coast, Neth.-Ger., Dec. 1, 1964, 550
U.N.T.S. 128.
134 See Continental Shelf (Tunisia-Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), 1982 I.C.J. 63, art. 5 ¶ 107
(Feb. 24).
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variables that are not predictable, and may "tilt the scale one way or the
other," in favor of one State over the other.135
Unification agreements are implicitly allowed under Articles
76(10) and 83, and help advance two important interests. They resolve
the issue of inequitable exploitation by creating possessory interests in
the quantifiable output of shared hydrocarbon resources and they
promote the efficient exploitation of hydrocarbon resources. This is
especially important if the desired outcome of a delimitation agreement
is to set the stage for the optimization of transboundary hydrocarbon
exploitation. However, issues present themselves that may stand in the
way of optimization. Since there is no current protocol governing
transboundary hydrocarbon deposits spanning between the Area and
coastal States, it is certain that such issues will crop up. For illustrative
purposes, imagine a transboundary hydrocarbon deposit that spans
two coastal Party States and the Area. What would happen in the case
where coastal States had a unification agreement in force prior to
ratifying UNCLOS? It would be particularly troubling if the States'
unification agreement included the entirety of a deposit, spanning into
what would become the Area, and it is unclear how one would
reconcile this possibility with Article 137.136
What if the above mentioned States are allowed to exploit
hydrocarbons in the Area, but are bound under reservation
requirements, similar to that prescribed for mining under UNCLOS
Annex III, Article 8?137 A situation like that is inherently complex and
poses a number of possible quandaries. Questions about the percentage
of production/profit sharing under a unitization agreement may arise,
and States could be required to produce more hydrocarbons than
necessary for their economic or energy needs. In the case where the
Area owns rights to the majority of a hydrocarbon deposit and the
coastal States own rights to the minority, the sponsor State may only
want to exploit an individually equitable percentage of the shared
deposit and may not wish to form an agreement in which it has rights
under Part VI. A concern for the sponsor State might be whether it is
possible and permissible to exploit these hydrocarbons without
135 Id
136 UNCLOS, supra note 13, art. 137 (expressing who may exert rights over the Area).
137 Setting forth the mineral-sharing regime for States seeking to mine in the Area.
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compromising the rights of the coastal States under Article 142.138
Further, what if the Authority requires State production limitations to
exploitation for all hydrocarbon resources in the Area? Depending on
the method of limitation and related potential protocols, what effect
would such a regime create? All the issues that arise from this
hypothetical cannot be addressed under the current scope and direction
of Authority protocols and UNCLOS, especially in light of the
considerations concerning migratory subsoil hydrocarbons, and the
protection of the States' rights over their mineral resources.
Without a protocol on the topic of transboundary hydrocarbon
deposits, the apparent conflict between Articles 77 and 137 may create a
situation where a coastal State is not allowed to exploit its own
hydrocarbons from its continental margin. Since coastal States are best
equipped to know the expanse of their subsoil hydrocarbon deposits,
and if no exploration has been conducted in the Area for data on
hydrocarbon potential, a State may inadvertently claim rights over
resources that it has no rights to. Unfortunately, the benefit to mankind
is not always an incentive for coastal States to exploit hydrocarbons, nor
is it always economical. In light of this, UNCLOS may actually create an
economic disincentive for coastal States to cooperate and invest in
hydrocarbon exploitation where deposits pan into the Area, especially
if States are seeking to lower the costs of energy.
XII. CONCLUSION
Considering the complex and often vague nature of UNCLOS,
with its annexes, rules, and protocols in relation to the question of
subsoil hydrocarbons, there are no simple answers regarding State and
the Authority hydrocarbon agreements and other ensuing issues. These
issues are further complicated when non-party States are included in
the consideration. While it is in the best interest of coastal States to gain
optimal economic and/or energy outcomes over their neighbors,
UNCLOS addresses only some of these issues in an equitable manner
through Part VI and Part XI's articles on delimitation, the enumeration
138 I.e. UNCLOS art. 142(1) ("Activities in the Area, with respect to resource deposits in
the Area which lie across limits of national jurisdiction, shall be conducted with due
regard to the rights and legitimate interests of any coastal State across whose jurisdiction
such deposits lie.")
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of coastal State's rights, and provisions seeking to resolve issues of
mineral deposits past the continental margin. However, glaring
ambiguities in verbiage and constructive double standards lead to a
regime of all-or-none diplomacy when the Area is involved. As no
Authority protocol or implementation agreement exists for the
exploitation of deep sea hydrocarbons, it is difficult to deduce what
exactly the particulars of a multilateral hydrocarbon agreement should
be, and whether they would resolve the many issues, questions, and
concerns that were noted throughout this paper. Therefore, the
possibility for protracted disputes, conflicts, and disagreements remains
high. In order to become more effective in facilitating coastal States and
the Authority's interests in deep sea hydrocarbon exploitation,
UNCLOS needs to better define the limitations of the rights of coastal
States over their continental margins and develop a much needed
hydrocarbon regime.
